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© [Tiina Paloniitty, 2015] . The definitive, peer reviewed and edited version of this article is published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 9 the benefit of legal scholarship is that ecology cannot be reduced to Newtonian mechanics or to hydrodynamics, for example. The theoretical foundation of ecology has until recently been more empirical than conjectural. This means that drafting regulations based on the results of ecology is a much more complex and contingent undertaking than implementing the results of, say, mechanics. 14 The answers ecology may give differs in important respects from the answers supplied by pure-i.e. less applied-fields of science. Accordingly, legal scholars should proceed with caution each time they see ecology used as extrajudicial material for judicial decision-making.
Nonetheless, ecology is used, with or without constraint-a situation demanding further investigation and analysis.
Let us now take a closer look at a piece of regulation in which the results of ecology play a significant role. Before focusing on practical problems that have occured, let us briefly survey how the problem can be handled theoretically.
In Lena Wahlberg's analysis of the problems environmental law confronts when trying to draw on scientific information, she divided the challenges into several 14 Olli Malve, Water quality prediction for river basin management (Teknillinen korkeakoulu 2007) <http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2007/isbn9789512287505> accessed 18 February 2014, 23−4. E.g. the determination, calibration and validation of models used in ecology is affected by a rather large number of factors. This is not the case in less applied fields of science which do not aim to tackle problems like eutrophication or other water pollution. published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 10 categories. 15 One of the most crucial differences between legal scholars and scientists is the conception of causality they use: legally relevant relations pertain between legally relevant causes and legally relevant effects irrespective of whether these are scientifically relevant. 16 This point is by no means a new one: legally relevant causation or a legally relevant standard of proof has long been known to differ from scientific causation. 17 The important point regarding the use of ecology as a tool for regulation is the difficulty produced by the very framing of the question in law-and this can be seen as the root of the problem. According to Wahlberg, what makes matters so difficult is that legal scholars or lawyers responsible for drafting regulations ask different questions than those posed by the relevant scientists in the course of their studies, 18 a conceptual and disciplinary gap implying that the findings needed might not even exist in the terms in which they are sought. 19 15 Lena Wahlberg, Legal Questions and Scientific Answers: Ontological Differences and © [Tiina Paloniitty, 2015] . The definitive, peer reviewed and edited version of this article is published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 12 entity' poses another challenge: the way behavior is isolated and defined in scientific research does not automatically equate with the behaviors of interest to draftsmen, practicing lawyers or legal scholars. Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml
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As a directive the WFD has not gone without challenge: feedback has been given on the directive from the EU member states and from environmental law scholars for a variety of reasons. One particularly relevant criticism is that made by Josefsson and Baaner. 26 According to them, the WFD does not make the best use of ecological or of biological knowledge. The ecological status of a water body is defined with biological 'quality elements', which are classified by scientists at the EU level and in the Member States. 'Quality elements' are items of fauna or flora either found or not found in the water body. 27 The point of the criticism is that, when gauging the 'good ecological status' of waters, these are secondary features. 'Good ecological status' is more about structures and processes of aquatic ecosystems, rather than the presence or absence of single elements. The chosen path has led to an 'one out, all out' system which does not give the desired results. 28 Our example seems at least to indicate that scientific knowledge is not always used in the best possible way in legislative contexts-a matter we shall return to. 29 Despite this, it is common that the results of (social) sciences are used in law in order to provide important regulation. In the case of the WFD, however, ecology seems to have a different role. It seems that more nuanced, normative and factual elements have become commingled.
When its analyses and results are used for establishing the norm-i.e. for determining which water bodies reach and which do not reach 'good ecological status'-ecological knowledge has passed the point of being just a regulatory tool.
The change wrought by the WFD is particularly salient in the context of the civil law system (which is the main focus of the present analysis). In the civil law system, the understanding of judicial decision-making has long been about facts and norms: sein and sollen, is and ought, as distinct domains. Adjudication has been understood to act like a logical syllogism-a nearly automatic pattern in which the factual and normative follow each other until a conclusion is reached-even though that understanding has been criticised in much of the literature. 30 The criticism has concurrently stimulated a quest for a more nuanced perception of judicial decision- Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 15 of logic and proceeded to considerations of material acceptability: the rhetorical approach also takes the context into account-the dialogical approach goes even further by accepting arguments relevant to those participating in the discussion. 31 Whereas the strict logical syllogism expresses internal justification, the latter two approaches are examples of external justification. 32 Still, all the various ways of trying to grasp the problem have glossed over the meaning of the concepts of norms and facts while trying to explain how they interact-and in a rather persistent manner, trying to assure the reader that at the end of the day norms are superior to facts: what is normative is defined by the norms; facts are only used in the process, as grist to the mill. The types of facts relevant to legal decision-making can be analysed and divided, but even then facts are conceived of as something law refers to-at the most, the 'facts referred to in law have certain characteristics imposed by law'. 33 The scientist might be of great utility to the decision-maker, but still the roles of fact provider and decision maker remain distinct. 34 flexible-has not been completely successful. What the WFD and studies on using ecological knowledge in the field of law teach us is that if we in effect outsource judicial decision-making from individual permitting processes to the management planning stage-including purely scientific analysis-then that poses a real risk whose consequences are not to be underestimated. 42 How then might these decisively important problems be solved? Could the fuzzy divide between facts and norms be dissolved in a controlled manner in order better to meet the challenges of the current situation, identified in legal and legislative practice, and challenging the settled assumptions of much environmental law scholarship? To answer these questions we first need to realise that the WFD example reveals that what has traditionally been seen as the work of legal experts has swung in favor of the scientists, in so far as ecology is a field of science. The end result is that the normative is predetermined by the scientists, leaving the lawyers and judges with immutable boundaries. This is not due to the wording of the WFD but because the operative priority-in effect-granted to management planning leaves little-or no-room for the relevant permission-granting authority to form an opinion of its own.
We also need to realise that the normative part of the evaluation conducted according to the WFD is actually nothing new. When scientists evaluate data and published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 21 classify the quality of a water body according to an evaluation prescribed by the WFD, in addition to the scientific work involved, scientists do indeed evaluate water quality in a normative sense. 43 Traditionally, the interpretation of raw data has been the work of legal experts and ultimately this has meant giving expression to a value-based assessment because some values are deemed important enough to be protected by a legal system, others not. This is why the implementation of the WFD presents such a challenge for law: what has previously been done and what could be done within law is now done within the field of ecology.
The solution proposed here for this dilemma is to bring the normative decision-making back within the judicial realm by applying the results of theoretical studies which take account of values. Acccordingly, a key to solving the problem is realising that the problem lies not in ecological knowledge or in the structure of the WFD but in the fact that the value-based decisions required when using ecological knowledge could also be made within the field of law. Outsourcing normative decisions, as it were, to the scientists is not the only option. There is a case for expanding the zone of focus by turning to the objectives or values motivating environmental regulation. Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 24 law and economics to legal ecology do not appear feasible however. Legal order is not a workable object for ecological research-legal order does not form an ecological system for study. In legal ecology, the results of ecology are applied or-as discussed above-judicial decision-making occurs when/where the results of ecological investigation are gathered. As a gross simplification it might be said that some end results of legal actions are seen as more desirable than others and that this is more openly expressed in legal ecology than a comparable result might be in law and economics. 49 Accordingly, legal ecology is drawn further away from law and economics and closer to critical studies of law: critical legal studies (CLS), feminist legal theory and so forth. 50 Critical studies share the (howsoever constituted) outsider's view on the current hegemonic view amongst legal scholars-whatever that current hegemony might be-and aim to unveil the consequences for the legal system of the status quo. 51 The willingness to unveil consequences is what unifies legal ecology with critical approaches and distances it from law and economics: the critical approaches and legal ecology openly favor certain consequences, while law and economics-by 49 For how this is done in legal ecology, see text at n 72ff. © [Tiina Paloniitty, 2015] . The definitive, peer reviewed and edited version of this article is published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015, and can 
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The most notable difference between principles in environmental law and the aimsetting sections hinge upon the institutionalised position and the greater precision of the latter. When the aim-setting sections are adopted into law they are written in a more detailed manner than the general environmental principles usually are-if the latter have been codified in the first place. For example, the aim-setting section of Finnish EPA is divided into seven paragraphs, each defining which parts of ecosustainability ought to be considered: the aims are preventing pollution, repairing published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 42 definition has been transposed into Finnish legislation as is, except for insignificant modifications. 87 This definition has been one of the core issues in cases concerning permissions for peat production. In this form of local energy production conducted in Finland, peat is excavated out of mire and burned to produce energy. Excavating peat causes pollution to nearby waters and on downstream waters and land mainly via the runoff waters containing humus, an organic matter. Once the mire is opened and the peat excavated, the mire will become swampy once more in 5,000-10,000 years. Peat production is regulated by environmental permits granted according to the EPA and lower regulations based on it. 88 The SAC has adopted a stance in which the environmental harm that the production causes to the mire itself cannot be considered to be pollution in the sense of either the IPPC/IED Directive or the EPA. 89 In these rulings, the court states that © [Tiina Paloniitty, 2015] . The definitive, peer reviewed and edited version of this article is published in Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 55-74, March 2015 , and can be found online at http://www.elgaronline.com/abstract/journals/jhre/6-1/jhre.2015.01.03.xml 43 the harm the activity causes on the activity area itself by physically changing the area without emissions elsewhere falls beyond the sphere of the IPPC or the EPA. 90 Scholars have poured scorn on the SAC for its stance, arguing that the SAC unnecessarily restricts the interpretation of the definition of pollution. 91 Would the end result be any different if the case were to be adjudicated by deploying legal ecology? If the aims at EPA 1 § were taken seriously, the first step would be to define the relevant aims: safeguarding a healthy, pleasant and ecologically diverse and sustainable environment; promoting sustainable use of natural resources; and preventing pollution or repairing and reducing the damage it causes would seem to be the three most relevant ones. 92 (Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 2007) . The work is on EIA and thus the study is mainly concerned with the problems the stance causes for the application of EIA. Interestingly, the author still reckons one problem to be that the current standing of the SAC restricts the fulfillment of the aims of the EPA. ibid 162, fn 104.
